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ADMIRALTY.

Judge Brown, sitting in the District Court of Massachusetts,
was recently called upon to decide a question upon which, as
he observed, no case had been cited as a precedent
Charter
Parties,
and, within the experience of the expert witnesses
Liens for* called, no such claim had been known in the
Collision
shipping business. The steamship Barnstaple had,
by the terms of a charter-party, been given into the entire
control of the charter. It ran down and injured a vessel, the
owners of which libelled the Barnstaple. Then the owners of
the latter, as claimants, filed a petition against the charterers
to have a decree entered for the libellants in the collision case
against the Barnstaple and the charterers ; providing that the
damages awarded should be collected in the first instance
from the charterers, and only the balance be paid by the
vessel; providing further for a decree over against the charterers in favor of the petitioners. In support of their petition
the owners contended that as the harterers of a hired ship
must pay for its total loss or partial injury, so also if it should
injure another vessel and thus become subject to a lien in favor
of the owners of that vessel, the charterers ought to be bound
to discharge the lien.
Judge Brown decided the case upon a clause in the charterparty which provided that " the owner shall pay for the
insurance on the vessel." This provision, the court held,
could and did apply to the risk of all kinds of loss to the
vessel. The learned judge said: " If the owner has observed
the terms of his agreement he has obtained by the consideration that the charterer has paid him his indemnity against
loss." The petition was accordingly dismissed: The Barnstaple, 84 Fed. 895.
The duty of a person doing any service for a vessel, to
inquire as to her nationality and the residence of her owners,
Maritime
Liens,

Service in
Discharging

is illustrated by the recent case of The Burton,

84 Fed. 998 (D. C. Mass.), in which Brown, J.,

dismissed the libel of a wharfinger who-received

and unloaded a vessel upon the request of a ship

broker, when reasonable inquiry would have informed him
310
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that, under the terms of a charter-party, the charterer, a New
York company, was bound to pay these charges.
In The Lydia A. Harvey, 84 Fed. iooo (D. C. Mass.),
Brown, J., had an opportunity to apply a familiar principle.
The vessel had stranded off Plymouth Beach, and
Salvage,
Lien,
her owner not being able to afford the expense of
Interested getting her off, the insurer procured and paid for
party
the services of a submarine diver and raiser of
sunken vessels, taking an assignment of his claim and lien.
This lien the insurer attempted to enforce against the proceeds
of the vessel in the registry. It was held that he had not
acted as a voluntary adventurer, but in his own interest, and
consequently had no lien for salvage.
AGENCY.

Centrai Trust Co. v. Folsom, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 670, presents
a question of special interest to lawyers. B, as trustee, held
a mortgage on A's property; at the time when
Implied
Authority the interest became due, A drew a check to the
of Attorney order of C, attorney for B.
C returned a receipt
for interest by D, and A thereby learned for the first time that
B had assigned to D. Shortly after, the principal being overdue, and A desiring to pay it off, called on C and finding the
bond and mortgage in his possession drew a check to his
order for the principal. As a matter of fact C had no
authority to collect the principal and nobody knew how he
obtained possession of the papers. It was held, reversing the
judgment of the lower court, that the "scrivener rule," though
adopted in this country, only extended to the case where the
attorney had had charge of the investment from the beginning
-the rule in such case being that the mortgagor may rely
upon his continued possession of the papers; contra, here,
where C admittedly had not negotiated the original loan.
In Soule v. Palner,49 N. Y. Suppl. (Sup. Ct.) 475, plaintiff
leased a room to a company of which defendant, Palmer, was
president, the instrument reciting that it was
Lease to
"between Jeanne E. Soule, as landlord, party of
Company,
President's
Signature,
Personal
Liability

the first part, and the National Wrought Steel
Manufacturing Company and William W. Palmer,

as tenant, parties of the second part,
president,
... . and the said parties of the second part
covenant to pay the rent, etc." The lease was signed and
sealed by " William W. Palmer, president."
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In an action for the rent against Palmer, the latter
contended that the Manufacturing Company was the only
party bound ; that the word " president" after his signature
showed that he was merely signing as agent of the company.
The court, however, held that the addition of the word,
"president," was merely one of description, and that Palmer
was bound equally with the company for the rent.
Parol evidence of what Palmer thought when he was
executing. the leave was, of course, inadmissable to vary the
strict terms of the lease.
ASSIGNMENTS.

In an action to set aside a general assignment on the
grounds of fraud, it was contended that a large claim held by
Omission

from

Schedules,

Frauds

the assignor against a third party was withheld

from the schedules, and that the execution of a
mortgage by the assignor and others to a third
party, prior to the assignment, was fi-audulent.

Held, that if these were frauds, they were frauds upon the
assignment, and did not constitute a fraud in the assignment,
and could not, therefore, be made the basis for setting it aside:
Sweetser el al. v. Davis et al. (Supreme Court, App. Div.,
N. Y.), 49 N. Y. Suppl. 874.
CARRIERS.

A railroad company received certain cotton for shipment
over its road and a connecting steamship line. It owned a
Delivery to
Connectinggod

wharf at the point of connection on which it
deposited goods to be transferred to the steam-

Carrier,
Liability as

ship line, and according to the usage between
the two companies, the steamship company on

Warehouseman

being notified that goods had been received for

transfer to its line was allowed to load.direct from the wharf
on giving a receipt for the goods loaded, but further than this
the steamship company had no control over either the wharf
or the goods deposited thereon.
The cotton in question was deposited on the wharf, and the
steamship company notified of its arrival and requested to
remove it as soon as practicable, but before removal the
cotton was burned without fault or negligence on the part of
Held, (I) that there had been no
the railroad company.
delivery from the railroad to the steamship company; (2) that
the railroad company could not be considered to have ceased
to hold the cotton as a carrier, and to have become a ware-
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houseman, it having done nothing evidencing such intention:
Texas .& Pacific Ry. Co. v. Claj'ton cl al. (Circuit Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit), 84 Fed. 305.
The Supreme Court, Appellate -Division, of New York, has
decided that a statute requiring railroad companies to issue
iooo mile mileage-books, at two cents a mile,
Issue of
Mileage-books,
and declaring a forfeiture of $50 to any person
to whom such company shall refuse to issue a
Conditions
mileage-book as provided by the act, or, in violation thereof
to accept the mileage-book for transportation, does not authorize the company, as a condition of its transportation upon its
lines and the issuing of a mileage-book, to require the
execution of a contract by the purchaser that it shall be good
for passage only when presented with a passage ticket received
in exchange for coupons detached from the book: Corcoran v.
N. Y Cent. & R-. R. R. CO., 49 N. Y. Suppl. 701.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

A bill to restrain the enforcement of a city ordinance fixing
the rates of charge at which a water company shall supply
water, the averment in the bill being that such
Courts,
Jurisdiction, rates are so low as to amount to the taking of the
property of the company without due process of
Federal
Question
law, presents a federal question: Consoidated

Water Co. v. City of San Diego et al., 84 Fed. 369 (Circuit
Court, S. D. California).
The charging of a greater rate for a shorter than a longer
haul is not a violation of the fourth section of the interstate
commerce law when the rate charged for the
Interstate
Commerce Law, shorter distance is not in itself unreasonable,
Discrimination, and the more distant point is a commercial
"Circumstances
and Conditions"

centre and large distributing point, when there
exists strong competition both by land and water, none of
which conditions are present at the other point; such difference creating a dissimilarity of" circumstances and conditions"
within the meaning of the act, and that such greater charge is
not unlawful, though forbidden by the interstate commerce
commission in the particular case: Brewer et al. v. Central of
GeorgiaRy. Co., 84 Fed, 258.
CONTRACTS.

The Circuit Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in the
recent case of Horst v, Roelm, 84 Fed, 565, has followed the
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Anticipatory
Breach,

doctrine laid down in Dingley v. Oler, 117 U. S.
502, and denied in Daniels v. Newton, I 14 Mass.

WhenAction

530, that where a contracting party gives notice

Brought,
Damages

of his intention not to comply with the obligation

of his contract, the other party may accept this as
an anticipatory breach of the contract and sue for damages
without waiting for the time mentioned for the completion
and fulfilment of the contract by its terms. In such action
the measure of damages is the difference between the price
named in the contract and the price at which it is shown the
plaintiffs could have made sub-contracts for the delivery of the
goods, according to their agreement with the defendant.
Barnes Cycle Co. v. Reed, 84 Fed. 603, illustrates the
familiar rule that where a guarantor signs a guaranty for
Guarantee, future advances to be made to his principal, and
Notice of
the creditor has not at the time any binding
Acceptance
agreement with the principal, the so-called guaranty is but a mere offer, and cannot be enforced as a contract
by the creditor, unless the guarantor is notified of its acceptance.
CRIMINAL LAW.

The Court of General Sessions of Delaware, in State v.
Lock-wood, 39 Atl. 589, decided that the husband had,
Assault,
as head of the family, the right to use the neces-

sary force to dismiss a guest who had no right
to stay, but who persisted in staying after being
Head of
Family
told to go, without being guilty of an assault;
and the fact that the wife owned the property did not affect
the husband's right as the head of the family.
The District Court for South Dakota in Trpre Kirby, 84 Fed.
6o6, decided that a court will disbar an attorney convicted of
an offence involving moral turpitude, and to which
Conviction,
Disbarment, Congress has attached an infamous punishment,
Effect of
though it is not a felony, and the suing out of a
Supersedeas writ of error and the granting of a supersedeas
Expulsion of
Guest,

thereon, do not vacate the judgment, so as to prevent its
being ground for the defendant's disbarment.
The District Court of Delaware, in United States v. .Ifurply,
84 Fed. 609, decided that, knowingly providing the means of
transportation for a military enterprise to be
Neutrality
Laws,
carried on from the United States against Spanish
Military - rule in Cuba is within the meaning of section
Enterprise
5286. A military enterprise under this section is
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the combination of men; few or many, who organize into a
body within the limits of the United States with the intent at
the time to proceed in a body to a foreign territory to engage
in armed hostilities against a foreign power with which the
United States is at peace, and with such intent proceed from
the limits of the United States with arms or prepared to secure
them before reaching the scene of hostilities. The defendant
was the master of the Laurada and was indicted under the
above section for transporting a military enterprise from
Delaware.
EVIDENCE.

In Bently v. Falker, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 691, the question was
whether certain moneys had been paid by defendant to
Declarations plaintiff's son and whether the latter had paid
in theRegular plaintiff's debt with a portion of them.
The
Course of
books of a deceased banker were offered to show:
Business
(I) son's balance in bank; (2) receipt by the
banker of a draft to the son's order, and (3)a check drawn
against the fund so created by the son in favor of the plaintiff's
creditor and paid by the banker. These were rejected by the
trial judge and upon appeal his decision was reversed under
the rule "That all entries or memoranda made by deceased
persons in their course of business or duty by any one who
would at the time have been a competent witness of the fact
which he registers are competent."
In Kirkman v. Kirkman, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 683, the question
in dispute was, the value of the "good will" of a
Expert
firm of soap manufacturers. It was held that the
Testimony
opinion of a grocer who sold the product was not
admissible, since it was not a proper subject for expert
testimony.
In Dunning v. Maine Central R. Co., 39 Atl. 352, the
Supreme Court of Maine discuss the rule of evidence applied
Similar but to fires kindled by sparks from passing locomotives.
Unconnected The defendant contended that when the plaintiff
Facts
had shown that it was the Dover & Dexter train
which had passed immediately before the fire was discovered,
he had "identified" the locomotive, and hence could not
prove other fires kindled by defendant company's locomotive
at or about the time. At the time the objection was made,
defendant's counsel also stated that it was "No. 95." The
court held that this was not a sufficient identification to bring
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plaintiff within the rule and admitted the evidence. The
defendant, by proving or offcring to prove the identity of the
engine, could not limit the plaintiff's rights. This case seems
to be in accord with Mr. Justice Clark's full discussion of the
rule in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Henderson v. Railroad, 144 Pa. 461 (1892).
INSURANCE.

Mo.ulton et al. v. ,Etna Fire Insurance Co., 49 N. Y. Suppl.
570, was as follows: The policy was on goods owned by a
partnership and contained a clause avoiding it "if
Chattel
Mortgageon

the subject of the insurance be personal property

and be or become incumbered by a chattel mortgage." One partner gave the other such a mortgage to secure advances to the firm. The court held that
this did not avoid the policy, for both partners were presumably acceptable to the insurer and the transaction did not bring
a third party into contractual relations with the original parties.
The transaction is assimilated to a sale by one partner to
another of an interest in the firm. This does not constitute
a change or assignment of interest with the meaning of a
policy in New York (Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Home Fire
Ins. Co., 144 N. Y. 199 (1894)); this point is much disputed
and the contrary is the rule in several states (i Biddle on
Ins. § 224.) The question of a mortgage as distinguished
from a sale appears to be a novel one in New York.
The case of Backus v. Exchange Fire Ins. Co., 49 N. Y.
Suppl. 677, discusses the effect of a notice of cancellation
containing a distinct offer to return the unearned
Notice of
Partnership
Assets

cancellation

premiums.

It had been held that a notice which

did not contain such an offer was by itself insufficient; here the policy was cancelled without formal
tender or payment of the premiums. The court suggests
that a subsequent refusal to pay on the part of the company
might revive the policy. We might add that if the holding
were not thus, the door would be open to possible fraud.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

The so-called fellow-servant rule,
exempt from liability a master who has
Liability for with defective appliances.
Accidentto
proper ones, however, it is
Servant

of course, does not
furnished his servant
If he has provided
not fault if a fellow-

servant uses improper ones which happen to be

upon the premises: Campbell v. New Jersey Dry Dock &
Transportation Co., 39 Atl. 658.
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In the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin,
in the case of Webster v. City of Beaver Dam, 84 Fed. 280, the
court held that charter provisions imposing upon
Duty
of Property abutting property owners the duty of keeping the
Owners,
sidewalk in repair, and making such owners
Effect on

City's

primarily responsible for any negligence therein,
are for the protection of the -city, not the traveler,
and do not relieve the niunicipality of its duty to provide safe
thoroughfares, nor release it from liability for damage for
failure to perform the same.
Liability

NEGLIGENCE.

Hobson v. N. Y. Condensed Milk Co., 49 N. Y. Suppl. 209.
The Supreme Court of New York decided in this case that in
an action brought by a conductor of a horse
Action by
Conductor, car against the owner of a truck, to recover'
Negligence of damages for injuries caused by a collision, the
2
Driver
concurring negligence of the driver of the car,
who alone had charge of stopping and starting the horses to
avoid collisions, is not imputable to the conductor.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, in Chesapeake
& 0. Ry. Co. v. Steele, 84 Fed. 93, decided that, as far as the
Presumption United States courts were concerned, contributory
of Due Care negligence was a matter of defence to be established by the defendant, and in the entire absence of proof it
will be presumed that the decedent stopped, looked and
listened before going upon the track.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

In Citizens' Bank v. Millet, 44 S. V. 366, the defendant, an
agent of the drawee, in his individual name, drew a sight bill
Bill Drawn by on his principal for an indebtedness due the plaintiff
Agent on
(the payee) by the drawee. Upon the bill's disPrincipal
honor for non-payment, an action was broght
against the defendant. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
held that parol evidence was inadmissible to show an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the defendant
was not to be liable upon the bill, the agency of ihe defendant
being disclosed at the time the bill was drawn.
The authorities upon this question are in hopeless conflict,
though, perhaps, the trend of authority is in favor of the
admissibility of such evidence. See Pike v. Street, Moody &
Malkin, 226; McCulloclk v. Hoffinan, IO Hun. 133; Ames'
Cases on Bills and Notes, Vol. 2, p. 135, note 2.
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The plaintiff, a depositor with the defendant bank, deposited
with it a draft upon a bank in another city, which draft was
entered in the plaintiff's pass book as for "collecReceipted
The defendant forwarded the draft to an
Sight Draft tion."
Equivalent to agent, at the place where the drawee was located,
Payment for the purpose of collection. The drawee gave
to the agent a sight draft upon its correspondent in another
city, and the defendant, upon receipt of this information,
credited the plaintiff with the proceeds of the draft and notified
him to that effect. Upon presentation of the sight draft for
payment it was dishonored, and a month thereafter the
defendant notified plaintiff that the credit allowed him was
cancelled. Held, that the receipt of the sight draft by the
defendant's agent constituted, in the absence of any evidence
showing a contrary agreement, payment of the draft, and as,
therefore, the defendant had been paid the amount of the draft
deposited with it by the plaintiff, the defendant was liable in
that amount to the plaintiff: Kirkkzam v. Bank of America,
49 N. Y. Suppl. 267.
In Bank v. Weston, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 542, it was held that
an indorsement of a renewal of a note prior to its maturity by
Waiver of the indorser of the original note constitutes a
Notice
waiver of notice of dishonor. The court also held
of Dishonor, that an indorsement of a note by one partner in
Accommoda.
the name of the partnership for the accommodation
tion
Partnership of third parties and not within the scope of the
Paper
partnership business, is a fraud on the non-consenting partners and creates no liability on their part, as the
fact that the payee requested the plaintiff to discount the note
is notice of the accommodation character of the partnership
indorsement. It is well settled that an indorser or drawer
may waive presentment and notice by words or act. See
P/ipson v. Kuellor, I Starkie, 116.
PARTNERSHIP.

Where, in an action against A and B to recover for work,
labor and services, the complaint sets up a contract made with
A, and avers that the work thereunder proceeded
Action for
with the knowledge and consent of B, who had in
Work and
Labor,
the meantime become a partner of A, and with the
Pleading
knowledge and consent of their firm, no cause of
action is shown against B: Hodges v. Fied/teim (Supreme
Court, App. Div. N. Y.), 49 N. Y. Suppl. 529.
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Hanford, D. J., in the Circuit of the United States, Washington, N. D., deduced the following rules from the decisions
of the Supreme Court, upon the questions of
Circuit
Courts,
jurisdiction and effect of judgments covered by
Jurisdiction, them.
The circuit courts of the United States
Removal from
State Courts, have jurisdiction to decide questions as to their
Judgment,
own jurisdiction irv cases removed from state
Effeet
courts, and the decision of such questions by a
court which has jurisdiction of the parties, if erroneous, is
nevertheless binding upon the parties until set aside or reversed
by an appellate court, or by an order in a proper proceeding
in the same court. The judgment of a circuit court of the
United States in a case removed from a state court is binding
upon the parties to the same extent as it would be if the case
had been commenced therein by original process, and after acircuit court in such a case has entertained jurisdiction, and
proceeded to a final judgment, and the case has been carried
to an appellate court, and a decision rendered therein upon
the merits of the controversy, and after a mandate has been
issued, directing the manner of further proceedings in the circuit court, the decision of the appellate court is binding and
conclusive upon the parties and upon the circuit court. While
it is true that a court may not, by its own judgment, create
jurisdiction in its favor which the law has not conferred, and
while the parties cannot, by their consent, confer jurisdiction
upon a court, it is nevertheless true that, after parties have
voluntarily submitted a cause for determination upon its merits,
to a court of superior, although limited, jurisdiction, the submission of the cause, and the final judgment of the court,
together, do estop the parties from denying in a collateral
proceeding that it had jurisdiction, except in cases where it is
impossible to give effect to the judgment without violating the
constitution: Dexter, Horton & Co. v. Sayward, 84 Fed. 296.
In an issue whether D was a member of the defendant firm
the verdict was for the plaintiff. The opinion of the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island being that a preponderance
of the evidence was against the finding, gave a new
New Trial,
Abusive
trial because of an attack by plaintiff's counsel on
Words of
the defendant, which was groundless. The stateCounsel
ment by counsel was: "I expect at some stage
of
the game to show by the testimony of witnesses who are
perfectly disinterested and know about these transactions, that
it is an old trick of D to do such work-to get up a company,

PROGRESS OF THE LAWV.

PRACTICE (Continued).

get goods for twenty per cent. of what they are worth and
then swipe the whole business and steal the books, etc."
In the opinion of the court, this was calculated to prejudice
the minds of the jury and to prevent them from weighing the
evidence with that discrimination and impartiality to which the
defendant was entitled: Parker v. Cariage Co., 39 At. 242.
It was said by Vann, J., in Linton v. U. F. Co., 124 N. Y.
533, " Moreover, the main object of a pleading is to notify the
adverse party of the facts relied upon by the
Pleading
under
pleader to constitute a cause of action or a defence.
New York
The improvement sought to be effected by the
Code,
Action on

system of pleading provided by the Code was to
enable each party to know precisely what he
Hiring
would be required to prove upon the trial." A
recent ruling of the New York Supreme Court, Special Term,
Kings County, is in accord with this expression of pupose.
In an action by an employe for damages, for breach of a contract of service by discharge, it was held that it was no defence
to plead that the defendant discharged the plaintiff for good
and sufficient cause, and particularly for disloyalty to its
interests, and for conduct and actions harmful and injurious to
its interests. Under the Code Civ. Proc. S. 5oo, a defence is
a statement of new matter, viz: facts constituting a defence:
Hicks v. Car Spring Co., 49 N. Y. Suppl. 40.
One who has been used to common law pleading, seldom
reads a case under code practice without wondering whether
the very effort to simplify does not tend to complexity and to
delay, but that is "another question," and now an old and
unprofitable one.
An action was commenced on the first of a series of notes,
all of which were given for work done and materials furnished
in fitting up a drug store for the defendants. An
answer was interposed, amongst other things,
setting up a counter-claim that the defendants had sustained
damage by reason of the negligent and improper performance
of the work by the plaintiff. Judgment was obtained against
defendants in that action by default. The same plaintiff sued
upon the three of the notes next maturing, and the same
defence and the same counter-claim were again made. On the
trial the notes and the judgment roll were received in evidence
with the concession that the parties in the two actions were the
same and all the notes arose out of the same transaction. The
question was as to the effect of the preceding judgment. Was it
Contract of
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resjidicata? The Supreme Court, Special Term, New York
County, decided that the former judgment was a bar and that
plaintiff was entitled to judgment: Gralham v. Van Horn, 49
N. Y. Suppl. 4o.
QUASI-CONTRACTS.

In ITVI,,d v. laJ'ar, 49 N. Y. Snppl. 622, the Supreme
Court of New York refused to permit a recovery of
Mloney Paid money paid to the city authorities for a permit to
under
construct. vaults under a side-walk, even though
Compulsion

at the time of payment the plaintiff protested upon

the ground of his previous payment for a permit applying to a
portion of the space in question. The court held the payment
a voluntary one, as the testimony of the plaintiff that the payment was made to avoid litigation fearing a delay in the
erection of the buildings upon which he was to procure a build-'
ing loan, is not evidence of such compulsion as will prevent
the payment being a voluntary one. See 7)ixler v. City of
Ncw 1-i-k, T25 N. Y. 617; Swift Co. v. U. S., III U. S. 22 ;
Robertson v. FrankBros., 132 U. S. 17 ; Oceanic Steam Navigalion Co. v. Tappan, I6 Blatch. 296. The test as to whether
the payment be voluntary, laid down by Judge Van Brunt,
in UI-od v. Jfa7,ar,Sup-a, and by Mr. Justice Bradley, may be
well compared.
REAL PROPERTY.

Plaintiff, executor with power of sale, made a written contract with defendant whereby the latter agreed to purchase a
contract to

piece of land belonging to the estate.

In an action

for specific performance defendant excused himself
on the ground that the land had been, and was at
Outstanding
the time of the suit, in the possession of a third
Title,
Specific
person whose title was derived adversely to that
Performance of the testator and his devisees, and the defence
was held safficient. Although Sec. 225 of the Real Property
Law of New York (1896, c. 547), which provides that a grant
of real property shall be void, "if at the time of delivery
thereof, such property is in the actual possession of a person
claiming under a title adverse to that of the grantor," does
not appiy when the sale is by an executor, yet it is a wellrecognized principle of equity that a court will not decree
specific performance when the vendee would be obliged to
bring ejectment for the property. The court will never
compel a purchaser to take a title, where the purchase would
Purchase
Land,
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expose him to the hazard of litigation: Bullard v. Bickjdll,
49 N. Y. Suppl. (Sup. Ct.) 666.
The deed of warranty of a parent prevents his after-born
children from ejecting a bona fide purchaser of the realty.
Thus, a testator having been declared non compos
Warranty, mentis at the time of making a given will and for
Estoppel,Will, two years previously, a deed of warranty of three
of his sons will estop the children of one of them,
Insanity,
born after the execution of the deed, from recovof Maker.
ering in an action of ejectment against a bonafide purchaser.
And the judgment declaring the testator insane is a bar to a
recovery attempted to be founded upon an after-discovered
will, executed within the two years: Fee v. Fee, 49 N. Y.
Suppl. 292.
The modern tendency of the courts to decide questions
concerning fixtures upon real property according to the
intention of the person who erects them, rather
Fixtures,
than to the mere part of their physical annexation,
Mil,
Intention of is illustrated by the case, lfarkle v. Stacklhouse,
Builder
et at., 44 S. W. (Ark.) 8o8. There the court
decided whether a mill erected by a vendee on the purchased
property fell within the vendor's lien for the purchase money,
simply by inquiring as to the intention of the vendee whether
he intended it to be a permanent portion of the property or
not. Adaptation of the plant to the use or purpose to which
that portion of the realty, with which it is connected, is appropriated, furnishes the best evidence on the subject.
A trust deed was executed of land to permit M to receive
the rents during her life, subject to the " limitation hereinafter
Trust,
mentioned;" to sell, lease, 6r mortgage as M, by
Determina- writing, might direct; to invest the proceeds of
any sale, and pay M the interest, or to re-invest
tion,
in other realty, as M might direct, to be held
Rule In
Shelley's Case according to the trusts; and on the death of M to
convey the land, or such part as might remain, or the proceeds
thereof, to such persons as M, by will, may have appointed,
and, in default of such appointment, unto her " heirs at law or
next of kin." The Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey held that, since the ultimate destination of the trust
estate is in M's heirs at law or next of kin, the trust was a
continuing one, aud could not be terminated during M's lifetime. The words "heirs at law" and the words " next of kin "
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in such deed are synonymous, and the rule in Shelley's Case
does not apply: Hartlingv. Hartling, 39 Atl. 203.
RECEIVERS.

The difficult problems relative to receiverships are gradually
being solved : Veatcz v. American Loan & Trust Co., 84 Fed.
Mortgage of 274 throws valuable light upon. one of the more
Railroads,
important. A receiver had here been appointed at
Receiver's
the instance of a stockholder. The court admitting
Duties
that, if he had been appointed upon the petition of
a mortgagee or judgment creditor, the income would have
been impounded for the benefit of the petitioner, held that the
receiver, thus appointed, practically represented the company,
and might, therefore, like the company, pay claims accruing
prior to receiverships, or for betterments, or for interest on.
mortgage. In this proceeding the court was not advised as
to what had been done with the surplus, and not undertaking
to decide in advance whether it had been properly employed,
simply decided that at least the petitioner (holding judgment
for tort committed prior to receivership) was not prevented
from inquiring further on any ground that the income belonged
to the mortgagee.
SALES.

The Circuit Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, in Farwell
v. Iiton. 84 Fed. 293, has decided that where a person has
become a purchaser of Z>
goods through fraudulent
Rescission,
representations, and has made a partial payment
Tender of
Partial
thereon, but has sold a part of the goods exceedPayments
ing in value the payment made, thus rendering it
Received
impossible for the seller to rescind the sale in too,
such seller is not bound to tender the purchaser the payment
received as a condition precedent to maintaining replevin for
the goods remaining unsold.
SURETYSHIP.

National Bank of Redemption v. Rutlege, 84 Fed. 400,
contains a careful discussion of a familiar problem. It was a
Acts Done suit against a county auditor and his sureties on a
Virtute
bond conditioned for the "faithful discharge of the
Officil
duties of his said office." The complaint set forth
his signature and issue of $ i ooo of false and duplicate bonds.
Demurrer on the ground that the act was done not virtute
officii, but only co/ore qfficii, now overruled. Hammond, J.,
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points out that the Ohio State and United States courts,
following the leading case of People v. Sch"I'lcr, 4 N. Y. 173,
have taken a liberal view of such transactions and hold those
acts to be within his office which are done " in the discharge of
the very duties which the statute in express words requires of
him." The further statutory provision making this act a
penal offence is rightly regarded as controlling evidence of
the legislative interpretation of the scope of his duties.

TRUSTS.
A grantor, who is also a debtor, does not entirely dcprivc
his creditor of remedy by creating a trust estate. This decision
Grantor a was reached by the Supreme Court of New York,
Beneficiary, in the case of Schenck v. Barnes et al., 49 N. Y.
Suppl. 222, where the debtor had conveyed real
Creditors'
Rights
property to a trustee, to apply the profit thereof
for the benefit of the grantor for life, remainder over, With a
power of sale in the trustee. A judgment-creditor of the
grantor whose execution had been returned unsatisfied was
allowed to attack his debtor's interest.
The Statutes of the District of Columbia require that all
declarations or creations of trust shall be manifested and
proved by writing. There is no statute in force
Creation,
in the District putting an end to implied and
Parol
In Smithsonian Instilitte v.
resulting trusts.
Evidence
Meccl, IS Sup. Ct. 396, a man purchased land in Washington
with his own money, taking title in the name of his wife.
The wife died, then the husband, the latter bequeathing his
property to the Smithsonian Institute. The wife had died
intestate. Her heirs claimed the property. A bill was filed
by the Institute to establish their right under the will of the
husband and evidence was introduced of a parol agreement on
the part of the wife that the property should at their death
pass to the Institute. The trial court found in favor of the
Institute. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia. The Supreme Court, in a decision by
Judge Brewer, now reverses the decision of the Court of
Appeals on the ground that, though a purchase in the name of
a wife or child is presumed, in the first instance, to be a settlement on the wife or child, this is a mere presumption, and
may be rebutted. The case contains a summary of a number
of cases dealing with the general question.
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Brown v. AcGill, 39 Atl. 613, brings out several interesting
questions which are, however, rapidly becoming settled along
the lines indicated in the opinion. A woman in
Married
Women,
contemplation of marriage conveyed her legal
Spendthrift separate property to a trustee, the deed containing
Trust
the usual clauses for a sole and separate use
without anticipation. After -marriage sbe .contracted -a debt
with. express reference to this separate estate, and intent to
charge the same. It was held (i) that spendthrift trusts are
possible under the laws of Maryland; (2) that a person cannot
ordinarily create a spendthrift trust for his own use, thus enjoying the income and exempting the principal from liability for
his debts; and (3)that modern policy of the law does not
require that a married woman should be an exception to the
second proposition.
It has recently been held in New York that where, by will,
a trust of personalty was created for the use of a beneficiary
for life, but no indication of the testator's intent as
Personalty,
to the ultimate disposition of the fund itself was
Devolution

gi'ven, it devolved by statute on the next of kin,

and that, although the next of kin was the life beneficiary, the
fact did not prevent her from taking the reversion after her
own life estate: Brown v. Richter, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 368.
It was held in Spencer v. Weber, 49 N.Y. Suppl. 687, thatwhere
Power of
Trustee

a trustee has power to vary the investments of the
trust estate, a mortgagor who pays the principal

when due to the trustee or his assignee is not bound to
ascertain whether the trustee is acting honestly, or what he
does with the proceeds.
NVILLS.

A testator gave (I) to the child of J $Iooo; (2) to the
children of P $iooo; (3) to the child of S $Iooo; and
Construction, declared that, "in case of the death of any of the
Designation
above legatees before me, the legacy shall not
of Legatees
lapse, but shall go to their lawful issue, if they
leave such issue." J left several children, P had twelve
children, seven of whom were living at the date of the will;
only three of the five who had before died left issue. S had
one child who died before the will was made, leaving issue.
Held, by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, that the gift
to J's child, should be construed J's children, that the children
of P's children, whose parents died before the will was made,
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should not share with the children of those who were then
living; and that the gift to S's child, means to S's grandchildren: Dunn v. Cory, 39 Atl. 368.
The Supreme Court of New York, in Miller v. Mller, 49
N. Y. Suppi. 407, decided that where a husband devises to his
Devise, After- wife his right and interest in property which is
Acquired
held in her name, but which was purchased with
Property
money earned by both, and after making this will
the husband buys in an outstanding mortgage in his own
name, such devise does not include the interest secured by
the mortgage.

